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Re-regulation of Infrastructure Investment: Issues for the 
International Lawyer
PHIL C.W. CHAN*
Foreign investment is prone to regulatory risk. This is particularly so in respect of 
the utility sector, given the immovability of the infrastructure and the strong public 
interest in its regulation. Re-regulation of infrastructure investment can take many 
forms, including legislative or regulatory changes that foster competition previously 
not existing or environmental standards more onerous as well as increased tariffs 
and taxation. Unbargained for re-regulation always affects returns on the relevant 
investment.
State Sovereignty
It is the sovereign power of a State to amend its laws and regulations (and its con-
tractual, indeed treaty, commitments). If the re-regulation concerns taxation, then 
even developed countries are unwilling to give up their sovereign prerogative. Ar-
ticle 1 of Protocol No1 to the European Convention on Human Rights1 specifically 
states that the general interest of the State and its right to secure taxes override an 
individual’s right to his or her property from state interference.2
* LL.B. Hon. (HKU) LL.M. (Dunelm). Visiting Scholar/Visiting Professor, Faculty of Law, Common 
Law Section, University of Ottawa; Visiting Scholar, Institute of Chinese Studies, University of Heidel-
berg. This article was based on research the author undertook at the Hong Kong office of energy law firm 
Baker Botts LL.P. between November and December 2005 and was completed at the Lau terpacht Research 
Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge, between July and August 2006. The Author wishes 
to thank David Renton, Paul Serfaty, and Sandesh Sivakumaran for their valuable comments on earlier 
drafts of this article, the Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law for welcoming him as Visiting 
Fellow, and consultancy firm Yenji Limited for sponsoring his Visiting Fellowship.
1 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ETS No005), done at 
Rome on 4 November 1950 and entered into force on 3 September 1953. The Convention was subsequently 
amended by Protocol No11 (ETS No155) to the Convention, done at Strasbourg on 11 May 1994 and en-
tered into force 1 November 1998, to the effect that the then existing supervisory mechanism, consisting 
of a European Court of Human Rights and a European Commission of Human Rights, be restructured and 
replaced with a single permanent European Court of Human Rights. For an account on the theory and prac-
tice of the European Convention on Human Rights, see P. van Dijk and G. J. H. van Hoof, Theory and Prac-
tice of the European Convention on Human Rights (3rd ed.) (The Hague: Kluwer International, 1998).
2  Protocol No1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ETS 
No009), done at Paris on 20 March 1952 and entered into force on 18 May 1954. Article 1 of Protocol No1 
states that “[e]very natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one 
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However, it is a well-established principle of international law that a State may 
in no circumstance disregard its international obligations merely on account of its 
municipal laws that may allow or dictate otherwise. As the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in its 1932 advisory opinion in Treatment of Polish Nationals 
in the Danzig Territory3 declared, “a State cannot adduce as against another State 
its own Constitution with a view to evading obligations incumbent upon it under 
international law or treaties in force”.4 As the Harvard Law School Research in 
International Law concluded in 1935, “if a constitutional provision existing at the 
time a treaty is entered into cannot be relied upon to avoid performance of provi-
sions in the treaty with which it conflicts, it must be even clearer that constitutional 
provisions adopted subsequent to the conclusion of the treaty are not to be relied 
upon for that purpose. Were the contrary principle to prevail, a State would have 
only to write into its constitution provisions which conflicted with its existing 
treaties in order to be freed from the obligations imposed by those treaties”.5 The 
Harvard Research went on to point out that “if a State cannot plead provisions in 
its fundamental law in justification of a failure on its part to perform its binding 
treaty obligations, it follows a fortiori that it cannot rely upon provisions in its 
ordinary legislation for any such purpose”.6
In entering into an agreement with foreign investors, the host State exercises 
its attribute as sovereign State. This attribute, however, includes its consent and 
obligation to abide by agreements into which it has entered (pacta sunt servanda). 
The agreement may stipulate that the host State’s and/or another State’s laws and 
regulations apply. The agreement may also specify that international law and/or 
general principles of law shall control, assist or be disregarded.
The Need for a Stabilisation Clause
Lawyers are therefore engaged to structure a legal framework, with reference to 
international law, that will protect foreign investors from any unanticipated re-regu-
lation by the host State. In particular, foreign investors may ask that a stabilisation 
clause be stipulated in their agreement with the host State. Such a clause purports 
shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided 
for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, 
in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of 
property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions 
or penalties”.
3  Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in the Danzig Territory, 
PCIJ Ser.A/B Judgments, No44, 4 (1932).
4  Ibid, 24.
5  Harvard Law School Research in International Law, Part III: Law of Treaties, 29 Supplement to the 
American Journal of International Law (1935), 649, 1032.
6  Ibid, 1033.
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that future legislative or regulatory changes in the State will be ineffective against 
them.
A stabilisation clause is of pivotal importance in guaranteeing the rights of 
foreign investors. Hence, adequate attention must be paid to the drafting of a sta-
bilisation clause. Seeking to counterbalance the host State’s sovereign powers, such 
a clause will be interpreted by domestic and foreign courts and arbitral tribunals 
in the most restrictive manner. It therefore must cover all of the possibilities that 
may lead to undesirable re-regulation. The consequences of re-regulation must 
also be addressed before it occurs, and agreed compensation must be spelt out at 
this stage.
In addition, bilateral investment treaties may be entered into that set forth the 
rights of foreign investors of the respective signatory States. These treaties invari-
ably contain a stabilisation clause.
A number of countries have also taken the initiative of adopting investment 
codes that serve the purpose of a stabilisation clause. Nonetheless, these investment 
codes, being ordinary laws, are themselves subject to legislative repeal. Thus, a 
stabilisation clause in an agreement between foreign investors and the host State 
remains necessary.
Fundamental Change of Circumstances
In justifying re-regulation, the host State may claim that a fundamental change of 
circumstances (rebus sic stantibus) exists. A fundamental change of circumstances 
allows a breach or cessation of certain obligations owed by a State under a bilateral 
or multilateral treaty.
Article 62(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,7 providing for 
the defence, states that “[a] fundamental change of circumstances which has oc-
curred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and 
which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminat-
ing or withdrawing from the treaty unless (a) the existence of those circumstances 
constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; 
and (b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obliga-
tions still to be performed under the treaty”.8 In its 1997 decision in Gabõíkovo–
Nagymaros Project,9 the International Court of Justice ruled that “a fundamental 
change of circumstances must have been unforeseen; the existence of the circum-
stances at the time of the Treaty’s conclusion must have constituted an essential 
basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the Treaty”.10 Many provisions of 
7  Done at Vienna on 23 May 1969 and entered into force on 27 January 1980.
8  Ibid, Art62(1).
9  Case concerning the Gabõíkovo–Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia), ICJ Reports 1997, 3.
10  Ibid, 65.
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the Vienna Convention, including Article 62, are taken as codification of customary 
international law on the law of treaties;11 the defence thus need not be expressly 
specified in a treaty. Nonetheless, Article 62(1) is couched in negative terms, which 
indicates that the defence will be allowed only in exceptional circumstances.12 If 
the change is brought forth as a result of a breach of international law by the State 
invoking the defence, then the defence will not be available.13
The Rights of Foreign Investors under International Law
As States continue to be the primary actors and subjects of international law, bar-
ring a valid arbitration agreement with the host State a foreign investor may need 
to rely on its own national State to espouse its dispute with the host State.14 Under 
customary international law, a national State has full liberty whether or not to do 
so. 15
Nonetheless, foreign investors are entitled to the international minimum standard 
of treatment by the host State. In two separate decisions in 1986,16 the European 
Court of Human Rights concluded that the international minimum standard of treat-
ment does not apply to an investor operating within its own national State, and 
that any difference in treatment between foreign and domestic investors does not 
constitute discrimination contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights. 
In the opinion of the Strasbourg court, the international minimum standard allows 
foreign investors to resort directly to the European Convention to enforce their 
rights on the basis of the standard, without which they would have to seek diplo-
matic protection which may not be forthcoming. The difference does not constitute 
discrimination because it has an “objective and reasonable justification”. The fact 
that nationals and not foreign investors may be in a position to influence public 
policy through elections also, it was held, legitimatises such a difference in treat-
ment. The court on both occasions found its judgment to be commensurate with 
State practice. However, it ought to be noted that direct recourse to the European 
Convention is available in Council of Europe jurisdictions only.
11  Ibid, 38.
12  Ibid, 65.
13  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art62(2)(b).
14  The Permanent Court of International Justice in Case of the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions 
(Greece v United Kingdom), PCIJ Ser.A Judgments, No2 (1924), 6, indicated, at 12, that “[b]y taking up 
the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings 
on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights–its rights to ensure, in the person of its subjects, 
respect for the rules of international law”.
15  HMHK v The Netherlands, 94 International Law Reports 342 (1984), 345.
16  James v United Kingdom, 8 EHRR 123 (1986); Lithgow and Others v United Kingdom, 8 EHRR 
329 (1986).
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States are not required to compensate when re-regulating areas that are in the 
public interest, such as the environment and sustainable development, public health 
and safety, or public order. It is thus reasonable to conclude that a stabilisation 
clause, in either a bilateral investment treaty or a foreign investment agreement, 
will not survive any re-regulation in relation to these areas. As early as 1887, the 
United States Supreme Court decided that “[a] prohibition simply upon the use of 
property for purposes that are declared by valid legislation to be injurious to the 
health, morals, or safety of the community cannot in any just sense be deemed a 
taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit. Such legislation does 
not disturb the owner in the control or use of his property for lawful purposes, nor 
restrict his right to dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the State that its use 
by anyone, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public interest”.17
To be considered lawful under international law, any re-regulation of foreign 
investment must be non-discriminatory. The host State must accord foreign inves-
tors conditions that are no less favorable than it does its own nationals in similar 
circumstances. It is well established that governmental action taken against foreign 
investors for purely extraneous political reasons is discriminatory and violates in-
ternational law.18 Access to competent independent judicial process must be al-
lowed; otherwise a denial of justice, a separate and distinct international wrong, 
will be committed, engaging the host State’s State responsibility. Nonetheless, State 
responsibility will be engaged only after the exhaustion of all local remedies avail-
able in the host State.19
Re-regulation may amount to expropriation if it entails a substantial diminution 
in the values of the property. It is expropriation also if the re-regulation substan-
tially interferes with the investors’ use and enjoyment of their property. As the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal pointed out, “it is recognized in international law 
that measures taken by a State can interfere with property rights to such an extent 
that these rights are rendered so useless that they must be deemed to have been 
expropriated, even though the State does not purport to have expropriated them and 
the legal title to the property formally remains with the original owner”.20
In 1926, the Permanent Court of International Justice affirmed that international 
law demands respect for private property rights.21 In its 1962 resolution on States’ 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources,22 the United Nations General As-
17  Mugler v Kansas, 123 US 623 (1887), per Harlan J., 668–69.
18  BP Exploration Company (Libya) Limited v Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 53 Inter-
national Law Reports 297 (1973), 329; Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) v Government of the 
Libyan Arab Republic, 62 International Law Reports 140 (1977), 194–95.
19  Interhandel Case (Switzerland v United States of America), ICJ Reports 1959, 6, 27.
20  Starrett Housing Corporation and Others v The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
Others, 4 Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Reports 122 (1983), per Chairman Lagergren, 154.
21  Case concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Merits) (Germany v Poland), 
PCIJ Ser.A Judgments, No7 (1926), 4, 21–22.
22  UN GA Res 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962.
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sembly mandated “appropriate compensation” for expropriation of investment.23 
Under customary international law, wronged investors are entitled to “prompt, ad-
equate and effective compensation”. The Energy Charter Treaty,24 underscoring 
the concerns of the energy sector, also provides for compensation.25 Compensation 
for expropriated investment must amount to the fair market value.26 Compensa-
tion, to be considered adequate, must also be payable for loss of expected profits, 
provided that these expected profits are not too remote or speculative.27
In its arbitral award between LIAMCO and Libya in 1977,28 the tribunal de-
duced that Libya in its arbitration agreement with LIAMCO had agreed to the ap-
plication of general principles of law which included equity.29 Thus, the tribunal 
found it both reasonable and just that the formula of “equitable compensation” 
should be adopted in determining suitable damages.30
Enforcement of Entitlement to Compensation
To be meaningful, an entitlement must be capable of being enforced. The peculiar 
vulnerabilities of foreign investors in the host State, particularly in respect of ac-
cess to competent independent judicial process, have been highlighted. A foreign 
investment agreement, which may be reinforced by a bilateral investment treaty, 
will therefore invariably stipulate that international arbitration be the final and 
exclusive method in settling any dispute between the particular foreign investors 
and the host State.
Under customary international law, an arbitration clause has an independent 
character and thus survives the termination of the agreement containing it and 
continues to be in force after any such termination. The governing laws and place 
of the arbitration will have been agreed upon by the parties in, or determined by 
the arbitral tribunal so created by, the arbitration agreement.31
Article V of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards32 states that recognition or enforcement may be refused 
23  Ibid, para 4.
24  Done at Lisbon on 17 December 1994 and entered into force on 16 April 1998.
25  Ibid, Arts12 and 13.
26  Norway v United States (Requisition of Shipbuilding Contracts Case), 1 Annual Digest of Public 
International Law Cases 189 (1922), 189.
27  United States of America (on Behalf of P. W. Shufeldt) v Republic of Guatemala, 5 Annual Digest of 
Public International Law Cases 179 (1930), 181–82.
28  Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) v Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 62 Interna-
tional Law Reports 140 (1977).
29  Ibid, 175 and 209.
30  Ibid, 209–10.
31  Ibid, 176–80.
32  Done at New York on 10 June 1958 and entered into force on 7 June 1959.
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on any of such grounds as that the arbitration clause is not valid under the stated 
governing laws of arbitration or otherwise under the laws of the place of arbitra-
tion;33 that the arbitration was held in want for due process34 or in excess of 
jurisdiction;35 that the subject-matter of the award is not arbitrable under the laws 
of the State where recognition and enforcement is sought;36 or that the recognition 
and enforcement of the arbitral award would be contrary to the public policy of the 
State where recognition and enforcement is sought.37
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia refused to en-
force the aforementioned arbitral award between LIAMCO and Libya, for the 
subject-matter of the award, ie, nationalisation, was an act of State and therefore 
not arbitrable under American law.38 The award was also refused enforcement 
in Switzerland. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court found that there was not a suf-
ficient legal relationship between the award and Switzerland as required by Swiss 
law for the award to be capable of enforcement in Swiss courts, even though the 
arbitration took place in Geneva.39
Accordingly, with the wide powers which sovereign States possess in regulating 
foreign investment, caution must be accorded also the drafting of the arbitration 
clause, the ultimate shield for foreign investors from arbitrary re-regulation by the 
host State.
33  Ibid, ArtV(1)(a).
34  Ibid, ArtV(1)(b).
35  Ibid, ArtV(1)(c).
36  Ibid, ArtV(2)(a).
37  Ibid, ArtV(2)(b).
38  Libyan American Oil Company v Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, formerly Libyan Arab 
Republic, 482 F.Supp. 1175 (1980).
39  Socialist Libyan Arab Republic Jamahiriya v Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO), 62 Inter-
national Law Reports 228 (1982).
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